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The Multimarket Labour-Managed Firm 
and the Effects of Devaluation*
Andrzej Baniald 
11 October 1995
A b str a c t
This paper analyzes the effect of a devaluation of the domestic 
currency on the behaviour of a labour-managed firm which sells 
in both domestic and foreign markets and faces com petition only 
in the foreign market. It is shown that with high enough revenues 
from the domestic market, the labour-managed firm will sell less 
at home and more abroad after the devaluation, thus reacting in 
the same way as a profit-maximizer. An analogous reaction oc­
curs when the multimarket labour-managed firm receives a small 
export subsidy. The paper therefore extends and reverses the re­
sults of Mai and Hwang (1989) and Okuguchi (1991) who showed 
that under certain conditions a labour-managed firm will sell less 
abroad after the introduction of an export subsidy.
K ey w o rd s: Labour-managed Firm, Mixed Duopoly.
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1 In tro d u ctio n
The objective function of state-owned firms in Eastern Europe is con­
troversial. The standard approach is to assume that a state-owned firm 
maximizes social welfare. However, according to many economists, it is 
more appropriate to assume that state-owned firms in this region behave 
like labour-managed firms which maximize income per head1.
It is well known in the literature that the upward shift of the de­
mand function leads the labour-managed firm (henceforth LMF) to con­
tract production and employment in order to get higher income per ca­
pita. This “perverse” effect however did not occur in Poland: after a large 
devaluation of the Polish currency at the beginning of 1990, one could 
observe a huge expansion of exports (roughly 40%2) by the state-owned 
sector to the hard currency area.
We show that such an effect is not at odds with the behaviour of the 
LMF. In particular, we demonstrate that for a LMF selling at home and 
abroad, a devaluation of the domestic currency can lead to an increase 
of the foreign sales (if sales in the domestic market are high enough). 
Thus, the LMF can act in the same way as a profit-maximizing firm 
(PMF henceforth). The subsequent analysis also confirms this result for 
a duopoly in the foreign market with a foreign PMF. In this way we 
extend and reverse the results obtained by Mai and Hwang (1989) and 
Okuguchi (1991). These authors have studied the effect of an export 
subsidy in a duopoly model of international trade with labour-managed 
and profit maximizing firms. They found that an increase in the export 
subsidy for a LMF decreases its export and increases the export of a 
PMF if both firms export their products to a third country, but do not
1For instance, since 1990 we can observe a strong managerial role of the Workers 
Council body in Poland, which is elected by workers for a three years period and 
obtains full authority for firing and hiring managers and veto power over the strategic 
decisions of the firms [Frydman and Wellisz (1991)]. Schaffer (1991, 1992) argues that 





























































































sell in the domestic market3.
Contrary to Mai-Hwang and Okuguchi, we can say that an export 
subsidy can be an effective policy tool to adjust a labour-managed eco­
nomy in order to expand in a foreign market. More generally, our model 
also shows that for a multimarket LMF the upward shift of the demand 
function in one market does not necessarily lead to a “perverse reaction” , 
i.e., a reduction of sales in this market.
Related work by Horowitz (1991) also analyzed the international 
duopoly model with a PMF and a LMF in which firms sell part of their 
production in the domestic market and compete in a third market. In 
Horowitz’s paper the production function is linear and he considers a spe­
cific kind of increase in demand. As a result, in his model sales increase 
in the market where demand has increased and go down in another mar­
ket. Our model uses unspecified production function, and is thus more 
general. We also identify under which conditions the price discriminating 
LMF increases the sales in the market after an increase in demand.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we show under which 
conditions the labour-managed monopolist increases exports after the 
devaluation and illustrate the results with a linear example. The results 
from section 2 are confirmed in section 3 in which we analyze a duopoly in 
the foreign market. In section 4, high returns to scale from labour and/or 
small sales in the foreign market are shown to imply an increase of exports 
for the LMF after the introduction of an export subsidy. Moreover, 
the introduction of an export subsidy can lead to a welfare increase in 
the domestic country.Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains some 
computations connected with the linear example and the welfare effects.
3Note that the effect of the export subsidy is equivalent to a devaluation of the 
currency rate, since both cause an upward shift of the demand curve for the exporting 
firm. Therefore an analysis of the effects of a devaluation can be easily extended to 




























































































2 A  L abour-m anaged  M on op o ly
Consider a labour-managed firm which produces one product for the 
domestic market and exports it to the foreign market. As is widely 
assumed, instead of attempting to maximize profit, the LMF seeks to 
maximize net income per worker. We treat a LMF as a monopolist in 
both the domestic and foreign market and assume that the LMF is able 
to discriminate between the markets, implying that there is no arbitrage. 
The income per capita can be specified as follows:
b' =  w +  j ,  (1)
where w denotes the wages, l denotes labour, and II denotes profits. 
Profits are given by
U = R 1(q1) + eR2(q2) - w l - K , (2)
where qi, q2 are quantities sold in the domestic and foreign markets re­
spectively; R },R 2 are concave revenue functions from the foreign and 
domestic market respectively; K  is a fixed cost and e is the exchange 
rate defined in terms of the domestic currency.
Let
l = 9{Qi +  92), (3)
be a labour input function for the LMF; we assume that g is increasing 
and convex and that g{0) =  0.4 Substituting (3) and (2) into (1) and 
rearranging the terms yields the usual maximand for the LMF
y _ R \g x) + e R \q 2) - K  
g(<h + 92)
The labour-managed monopolist, hereafter LMM for short, is supposed 
to maximize Y  by choosing the quantities q\ and q2 sold in two markets.
4If q =  / ( / )  is a production function for the LMF with /(0 ) =  0, / '  >  0 and 
/"  <  0 then g is defined as an inverse function of / .  Note that in this case we assume 




























































































The first-order conditions are given by
Y* = -g « ~ 9 ' Y ) = ° ' (5)
Yq2 = l- ( eR\2 - g 'Y )  = 0, (6)
where the derivatives of Y  and R ‘ are denoted by subscripts. (5) and
(6) imply the general price discrimination rule: equalization of marginal 
revenues between markets. Moreover, for R l {qi) =  9iPi(9i), R 2{q2) — 
92̂ 2(92) and e =  1 we get from (5) and (6)
P\ (9i) =  £2(92) = g'Y, (7)
where €,- is the elasticity of demand for market i. Hence, similar to a 
profit-maximizing monopoly, the LMM will charge the lower price in the 
market with the more elastic demand.
The Hessian matrix of the problem is
} HQl Y1 <7l<?2 K < n - 9 " Y -g " Y
YL ■'«2Î1 y <?2<72 1 <Q
_ eRl„ — g"Y<72 <72 2 J
Assuming that the second-order conditions are satisfied, i.e., that the 
Hessian H is negative definite, we can evaluate the effect of a devaluation 
of the domestic currency on sales by totally differentiating Eqs.(5)-(6) 
with respect to 91,92 and e. This yields
d9i g'R2/g
d92 (g'R2/g) -  R l  .






(9'R2/9) ~ sT{Y)2/e } < 0, (10)




























































































We see that the sales in the domestic market always go down after a 
devaluation, whereas the way in which foreign sales change depends on 
the sign of expression (g'R2/  g) — R 22 . If this expression is negative, then 
foreign sales go up after a devaluation5 6. From the first-order condition 
(6) we obtain
-[(g,R 2/ g ) - R l }  = - ( R 1 - K ) .°  (12)v eg
From (12), if the revenue in the domestic market is greater than fixed 
costs, then the LMM increases sales in the foreign market. Note that 
in this case the LMM behaves as a profit-maximizing monopolist which 
increases production in the foreign market after a devaluation. If the 
expression (g1 R2/ g) — R 22 is positive, but close to zero, we can also expect 
a reaction from the LMM analogous to that of a PMF. Generally, if the 
expression (g'R2/g ) — R?q2 is positive then the reaction of the LMM in 
the foreign market is unclear, assuming that the optimal level of Y  is 
positive.
Figure 1 illustrates these results. The curve AB represents the 
revenues from the domestic market R 1- the curve CD represents the 
difference R 1 — K . Let q\ and q\ be the optimal sales if the monopolist 
sells in both markets. If q\ lies between the points E and F7, then R l — 
K  > 0 and the LMM increases foreign sales after a devaluation. If q\ lies 
to the left of point F, the change in foreign sales is unclear.
For the monopolist who sells only in the foreign market, the expres­
sion (12) is always negative (because R l — 0) and a devaluation always 
leads to a decrease of foreign sales. This well known result shows that
5 We implicitly assume that optimal level of income per head Y  is positive.
6Note that we can easily extend our analysis to the situation where the LMF is a 
price-taker in the foreign market. In this case the foreign revenues are J?2(92) =  P292 
and
- [ ( g ' t f / g )  -  R l )  =  p2 ( l  -  .
Hence, if g'g?/g <  1 then the LMF increases foreign sales after a devaluation. The 
condition <  1 is discussed in Section 4.
7Point q[ must lie to the left of E. If q\ lies to the right of E then, by moving it 
towards E, we can increase revenues R} and decrease labour input g, thus increase 





























































































a LMF behaves in the opposite way to a PMF. However, as we have 
shown, the LMM which operates in two markets can react to the up­
ward shift of the demand function in one market in the same way as a 
profit-maximizing monopoly.
The underlying intuition for the above results is as follows. If the 
LMM operates only in the foreign market then it solves the following
The first term in (13) denotes the revenue per worker (RW), the second is 
cost per worker (CW). The optimum is achieved when marginal revenue 
per worker (MRW) is equal to marginal cost per worker (MCW). Figure 
2 illustrates this. The curve M RW ' represents the marginal costs per 
worker before a devaluation. We can see that both functions M RW ' 
and M C W  are negative; the first because the revenue function R 2(q) is 
concave and the labor-input function g(q) is convex (see Appendix A), the 































































































and reduces the fixed costs per worker. The optimal level of output is 
equal to q'. After a devaluation the marginal revenue per worker function 
shifts to M RW "  and output goes down to q". In other words it is more 
favourable to reduce output in order to obtain a higher income per head.
Consider now the LMM which operates in two markets. Let q\ , q\ 
be the optimal sales in the domestic and foreign markets respectively. 
By definition we have q̂  as a solution of the following problem
R \q \)  +  eR2(q2) -  K  (  eR2(q2) I< -  R l(q l)\
m ax--------- --------- \--------=  max - r - ----------------—------ r*- .
92 5 (9 i + 92) 92 \ 9 ( 9 i  +  92) 9 (9 i + 9 2 ) /
The first term on the right-hand side of (14) represents revenue per worker 
in the foreign market. The second term on the right-hand side of (14) 
represents the “residual” costs per worker. They are residual because 
the revenues in the domestic market R 1(q*) are subtracted from the total 





























































































higher than fixed costs K, the residual costs per worker are negative. 
The optimum in (14) is achieved when marginal revenue per worker in 
the foreign market (M RW 2) is equal to marginal residual costs per worker 
(.M CW 2).
Figure 3 illustrates. The curve M RW \ represents marginal average 
revenues per worker before a devaluation. These revenues are positive for 
small values of sales in the foreign market 52 since the revenue created 
by additional sales is divided among all workers (see Appendix A). The 
curve M CW 2 represents the case when K  — B 1 (q*) > 0, in other words 
when the residual costs are positive. This situation is analogous to the 
one in which the LMM operates in only one market. After a devaluation 
the marginal revenue per worker shifts to M RW 2. As a result, sales in 
the foreign market decrease from q2 to q2.




























































































the marginal residual costs per worker become positive; this situation 
is illustrated by curve MCWIJ in figure 3. The initial optimal level of 
sales is now q and after a devaluation it increases to q%. Thus revenues 
from the domestic market can be treated as a subsidy to the residual 
fixed costs. Such a subsidy makes the marginal residue costs per worker 
positive. As a result the LMF reacts to any exogenous shock in the 
foreign market analogously to the PMF.
The change of total sales for the LMM can be obtained from (10) 
and (11) as
(15) shows that, if the expression (g'R2/g) — R22 is positive, then the total 
change in sales is negative. In particular, if the markets are identical, i.e., 
the revenue functions are the same, then, from (6), we get
Thus, if the markets are identical, the total change in sales is always 
negative, although we do not exclude the possibility that the sales in the 
foreign market will rise.
E xam ple: A  Linear M od el
As an example let us consider the linear inverse demand functions pi — 
ai — (p in the domestic market and = a2 — 92 in the foreign market, and 
a linear labour input function l =  g(q) = q. The revenue functions are: 
R ](qi) = q\(a\ — 9i ) for the domestic market and A2(g2) =  g2(«2 — 92) 
for the foreign market. Furthermore we normalize the exchange rate to 
1.
The system of first-order conditions (5)-(6) then is
(15)
(+)(-) (-)
a i — 291 (ai — 9i)9i +  (a2 — 92)92 ~ A 





























































































a2 — 2q2 (ai -  qi)qi +  (a2 -  92)92 ~ A' 
9i +  92
(18)
and can be rearranged and written in the following way (see Appendix
B)
q \+ q \  = K,
9i ~  92 =  ^ (« i — a 2)-
(19)
( 2 0 )
From (20) we see that the greater the market (the higher a,-), the more 
is sold in this market. Moreover, direct computation shows that the 
optimal revenues are proportional to the sales in the markets:
^ ( 9 i )  _  9i 
i?2(92) 92'
( 21)
Thus, if the domestic market is greater than the foreign market8 and the 
revenues from the domestic market are high enough to cover fixed costs, 
then a devaluation of the exchange rate leads to an increase in sales and 
a decrease in the price in the foreign market.




The expression in brackets is positive if the domestic market is big and/or 
the difference between markets is high. Note that from (22) we can see 
that total production decreases if markets are of the same size (ai =  a2) 
or if the domestic market is smaller than the foreign one (a! < a2).
We illustrate our example with Figure 4, which shows for which 
combinations of parameters ai,a2, and K  we can expect specific reacti­
ons. On the horizontal line we indicate m = (a\ — a2) /2, which measures 
the difference between the size of markets. The parameter m should 
lie between —\fK  and y/K , otherwise the difference between markets 
is so large that the LMM abandons the smaller one and produces only
8Note that transportation costs and trade restrictions reduce the size of the foreign 
























































































































































































for the bigger one. We also assume that aj > 2y/K  (line HG) and 
m < (ii/2 — \f~K (line GE) which means that the LMM selling in only 
one market (foreign or domestic) can get a positive income per head. The 
curve AB represents the combination of parameters for which dQ/de = 0; 
above this curve total sales are increasing. The curve CD illustrates the 
case where dq2/de = 0; above this curve the sales in the foreign mar­
ket increase after a devaluation. Thus, in area I (bordered by ABEF), 
the increase of foreign sales is greater then the decrease of the domestic 
sales which results in an increase of total sales. Note that in this case 
the domestic market must be bigger than the foreign market. In area II 
(bordered by CDBA) foreigil sales are still increasing, but the decrease 
in the domestic sales is larger. Note that this situation typically arises 
when the markets are equal and big enough. However it also arises when 
the foreign market is bigger but the size of both markets is big enough 
relative to the fixed costs. In area III (bordered by CDGH) foreign sales 
are decreasing. This is the case when the foreign market is significantly 
bigger than the domestic one.
3 A  D u o p o ly  w ith  L ab ou r-m an aged  and  
P ro fit-m a x im iz in g  F irm s
The assumption about the LMF being a monopolist in the foreign market 
is restrictive. It often faces competition from foreign firms. For this 
reason, we now consider a model in which the LMF is a monopolist in 
the domestic market but faces competition from a foreign firm in the 
foreign market. We assume that the foreign firm is a profit-maximizing 
one and sells a good which is a perfect or an imperfect substitute to the 
good sold by the LMF. Thus, the model covers both the homogeneous 
good and product differentiation cases.
The income per head for the LMF given by (4) can be modified to
y  _ R \q i)  + e R \g 2, q l ) - K




























































































where, as before, qi, q2 are quantities sold in the domestic and the foreign 
market respectively, and g(qi + q2) = l is a labour input function for the 
LMF with g(0) =  0, g' > 0, and g" > 0. R 1, R 2 are the revenues func­
tions from the domestic and foreign markets respectively. It is assumed 
that R 2 is concave with respect to q2 and decreasing with respect to the 
competitor’s sales q*2. Finally, K  is a fixed cost and e is the exchange 
rate expressed in the domestic currency.
The profit function for the foreign PMF is
II* -  ?2) -  W‘g*(q*2) -  K \  (24)
where w* is the foreign wage and variables with asterisks are associated 
with the foreign firm.
Assume that the labour-managed domestic firm maximizes its profit 
per unit of labour, while the foreign firm maximizes its profit and that 
the two firms use Coumot-Nash strategies. Under these conditions, we 






Yn =  -g ( e R l - g ' Y )  =  0, (26)
n ; .  =  R ; . - w * g * ' =  0. (27)
From (25) and (26) the LMF still equalizes marginal revenues between 
markets, but their level is now influenced by the PM F’s sales q2. The 
second-order conditions require that II*. < 0 and that the matrix







We also impose a condition for stability, notably
Y1 9i9i Y
Y1 92 91 Y





























































































is N-P, i.e., it has all the principal minors of odd orders negative and 
those of even orders positive9. We will denote the 3 x 3  matrix from (29) 
by A. From the stability condition it follows that det A  < 0.
Total differentiation of Eqs. (25)-(27) gives the following compara­
tive statics matrix equation:
d?i g'R2/g
A dg2 = (,g'R2/g ) -  R l
dg2 0
(30)
We are now in a position to evaluate the effect of a devaluation on duo- 
polistic sales by solving system (30). We start with the foreign sales of 
the LMF. From (30) we obtain
d g2
de
nSiSi Yv A(g'R2/ g ) - R 2q2\ + g'g"R2Y/g
(-) (+)
(31)
If we compare (31) with the reaction of the LMM described by (11), we 
see that the expressions are similar. In particular if the value
- l(g 'R y g ) - R l 2] = ~ ( R 1- K )  (32)
is positive then the LMF increases foreign sales after a devaluation. 
Hence, this problem is equivalent to the one of the LMM, so there is 
no need to repeat the analysis here.
From (30) we get for the domestic sales of the PMF
S  =  ^ A { ~ Y" ^  {{9'R2/9) ~  "  9 9"R2Y/g}. (33)
Moreover, (31) and (33) imply that
d<?2 /  d<?2 _  iïq’g., 
de /  de “  U*.q. '
(34)
9This terminology is due to Nikaido (1968, p.361) and stands for the “negative­




























































































Thus, if n 9.?2 < 0, that is, if the PMF treats the good as a strategic 
substitute10 then its sales move in the opposite direction to those of 
the LMF. This is a standard result in the literature11. However, in these 
models the LMF always decreases sales in the foreign market when facing 
an upward shift of the foreign market demand curve. In our model, to 
the contrary, the multimarket LMF can increase production when facing 
such a shift.







TT* IT*U 9l92 1192'9j J
(35)
+ [o 'iJV s) -  ^ , ]  n *»]}  •
(35) shows that when the PMF treats the good as a strategic substitute 
(n 9-?2 < 0) and when expression (g'R2/g ) — R\2 is negative, then the 
LMF decreases production in the domestic market after a devaluation.
We can sum up our results in the following proposition.
P roposition  1 If
(a) in a Coumot-Nash equilibrium the LMF revenues in the domestic
market are high enough to cover fixed costs (R} — K  > 0) and
(b) the PMF treats the good as a strategic substitute (TI?<92 < 0),
then a devaluation of the domestic currency (an increase of e) leads to
(i) an increase in foreign sales and a decrease in domestic sales for the 
LMF and
10This is a widely used assumption in a Cournot oligopoly with profit maximizing 
firms. However, strategic complementarity (n ,jg2 >  0) can emerge as a result of 
natural demand and cost structures. For more details see Bulow et al. (1985) and 
Baniak-Phlips (1995).




























































































(ii) a decrease in sales for the foreign PMF.
If there is more than one foreign competitor of the LMF then devalua­
tion becomes a more effective tool of export promotion. The underlying 
intuition is as follows. If there are more profit-maximizing competitors 
in the foreign market, then the total sales of foreign firms will be higher 
in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the residual revenue of the LMF in 
the foreign market shifts downward. From Section 2 we know that if the 
revenue from one market increases, then the sales in the second market 
decrease. Analogously, the LMF will react to a downward shift of foreign 
revenues by increasing domestic sales. Thus, from Figure 1, it is more 
likely that the revenues from the domestic market will cover fixed costs.
4 T h e E ffects o f  an E xp ort S u b sid y
To consider the effect of an export subsidy to the LMF we need to modify 
our model slightly. Let s be an export subsidy per unit of foreign sales. 
Then the revenues of the LMF from the foreign market are
•R2(?2, s ) = 92̂ 2(92) +  92«, (36)
and the income per head for the LMM is
Y _ R '(qi) + R*(q2, s ) - K
g(g 1 +  92)





de d e t# ,
(+)
' (-) (+) (+) ' 
{ M ) - 7 y < 0,
-  !] +































































































From (38) and (39) we see that, assuming Y  > 0, an increase in the export 
subsidy leads the LMM to a decrease in domestic sales. If g'qz/g < 1, 
then the LMM increases its foreign sales12.
Using the fact that the input-labour function g is inverse to the 
production function /  we can write
ff'(9i +  <72)̂ 2 ________ 92______  _  Qifjh +  h)______ __ £2
9(9 1+ 92) (h +  h)f'{h  +  h) (h +  h)f' (h +  h){<li +  Q2) 6/
(40)
where a 2 =  92/(91 +  92) < 1 is the ratio of foreign sales to total sales 
for the LMM and e/ =  / ' / / / <  1 is the elasticity of the production 
function. Thus, if the elasticity of the production function is higher than 
the proportion of foreign sales in total sales, then the LMM increases its 
foreign sales after the introduction of the export subsidy. In particular, 
if /  is a constant elasticity production function /( /)  =  l0, 0 < P < 1
then €/ — P and for a low enough proportion of foreign sales (a2 < /?) we 
can expect an increase in foreign sales. This illustrates that the crucial 
point here is the high ratio of the domestic sales in total sales, as with 
the devaluation case. Thus, if the multimarket LMF sells mainly at 
home, the introduction of an export subsidy can be an effective tool for 
promoting exports.
Generally, the elasticity of the production function ej measures the 
degree of returns to scale: the higher e/, the higher the degree of returns 
to scale from labour. Rearranging (39) and using identity (8) we obtain
d92
de ------- (R ldet
(-)
(41)
From (41) we see that ceteris paribus dg2/de increases with an increase in 
ej . In other words: the higher the degree of returns to scale from labour, 
the more the LMF will sell in the foreign market after the introduction 
of the export subsidy. It is obvious that the PMF would react similarly 
in the same situation.
12It is easy to show that the same condition emerges when the LMF is a price-taker 




























































































All that has been said about the LMM can be extended to a duopoly 
with the domestic LMF selling at home and abroad and the foreign PMF 
selling only at home. Thus, we can extend the results of Mai and Hwang 
(1989) and Okuguchi (1991). In particular we can show that the LMF 
selling at home and abroad can increase foreign sales after a small increase 
in the export subsidy, a possibility which was not considered by these 
authors.
If the LMF faces more competition in the foreign market, then, 
analogously to section 3, it increases sales in the domestic market. In 
this case the export subsidy becomes a more effective tool for promoting 
exports.
W elfare E ffects
We now evaluate the welfare effects of the introduction of an export sub­
sidy in the domestic country. This is done by considering the impact of 
changes in s on the net-consumer surplus Z l (p\ ) in the domestic country, 
on the subsidy losses sq2 and on the profits II of the LMM. Following 
Amis and Ross (1992) we can see that the effect on welfare W 1 in the 
domestic country will be
d H ^ _ d Z ^ d p i_  dq2_  <ffl
ds dpi ds ds ds (42)
Evaluating (42) at s — 0 and given that dZ 1/dpl — —q\ we find that
d W 1 dPl dn
(43)
After some manipulation (see Appendix C) we can simplify (43) to
d W 4 P i
ds ds g ds
The first term in (44) is always negative and measures consumer losses 
connected with an increase in price in the domestic country. The second 




























































































total output of the LMM increases after the introduction of an export 
subsidy (dQ/ds > 0) and the optimal level of profits of the LMM is 
positive and high enough, then the second term in (44) can outweigh the 
first one and the welfare effect may be positive13.
Coming back to the linear example from section 2 we see that 
g'q2lg — q2/Q and is less than 1. Thus, the LMM will always incre­
ase sales in the foreign market. This stems from the fact that the degree 
of returns to scale for linear production function /( /)  =  l is equal to 1, 
the highest possible value.
The change of total sales is
dQ _  1 gi ~ g2 
ds ~  2 Q ’
(45)
and is positive only if domestic sales exceed foreign sales. Rearranging 
(44) and performing some algebra (see Appendix C) we obtain
d W 1 
ds 4 q




where, as before, m = (ax — a2)/2. Equation d W 1 / d.s =  0 defines ax 
as a function of m. For all combinations of a,\ and m which lie above 
the curve dIT’1/d.s =  0, welfare will increase after the introduction of an 
export subsidy. This situation is illustrated in Figure 5. The curve AB 
represents the equation dW 1 /ds  =  0. Above this curve (region I) welfare 
increases, below this curve (region II) welfare decreases.
We see from figure 5 that an increase in welfare is assured when the 
domestic market is bigger than the foreign one («i > a2) and when mar­
kets are large enough compared with fixed costs (K ) and the wage level
13It is interesting to note that the introduction of an export subsidy for the PMF 
in an analogous situation leads to welfare losses. In this case, from the envelope 
condition, we have d ll/d s =  q2 and from (43) it follows
d W 1 dpi
ds 91 ds
Thus, if the PMF exhibits diseconomies of scale, then it decreases sales and increases 

























































































































































































(w). In this case the LMM makes high profits before the introduction of 
an export subsidy. The increase in sales in the foreign market after an 
export subsidy is such that the increase in profits in the foreign market 
outweighs the consumer losses in the domestic market and the decrease 
in profits in the domestic market.
5 C onclu sion s
We have shown that for a LMF which sells in the foreign and domestic 
markets a devaluation of the domestic currency can lead to an increase 
in exports, a reaction which can not occur when the LMF sells only in 
the foreign market. The LMF will increase exports after a devaluation 
when the sales in the domestic market are high enough or, equivalently, 
when the revenues from the domestic market are high enough to cover 
fixed costs.
A similar effect -  an increase in exports -  can occur when the 
multimarket LMF receives a small export subsidy. This will happen if the 
sales in the foreign market are relatively small and/or the productivity 
of labour (measured by the degree of returns of scale) is low.
These results are related to work of Krugman (1984) who showed 
that in a duopolistic multimarket model with economies of scale, the 
introduction of import protection (in the form of quotas or tariffs) will 
lead to an increase in exports. In other words import protection implies 
export promotion14. Using the results from Section 2, we can analyze the 
same problem for the LMF. Consider an LMF which sells in the dome­
stic and foreign markets and faces foreign competition in the domestic 
market. The introduction of import protection leads to a decrease in 
sales for the foreign firm and to an upward shift of the residual domestic 
demand for the LMF. According to the results from Section 2, the LMF
14Krugman assumed strategic substitutability among the duopolists. If we assume 
strategic complementarity and diseconomies of scale, then the introduction of import 
protection leads to a decrease in exports. Such a result can be easily obtained from 




























































































will always react by contracting its exports and the change in sales in 
the domestic market is ambiguous and depends on the relative size of the 
markets. Thus, for the LMF, import protection always implies a decrease 
in exports, although it can lead to an increase in domestic sales.
Throughout the paper we assumed that the LMF is a monopolist 
in the domestic market. Of course this assumption could be relaxed. 
For example, if the LMF meets competition in its home market, the 
effects of a devaluation or an export subsidy will be the same as when 
it is a monopolist in its domestic market. This stems from the fact that 
the domestic competitors react indirectly to a devaluation and therefore 
adjust only to the direct reaction of the LMF to a devaluation. The 
situation becomes more complicated for a duopoly with both the LMF 
and the PMF selling at home and abroad. In this case the PMF will 
sell less in its foreign market after a devaluation and this direct effect 
will influence the change in the sales of the LMF15. Such a model for 
two PMF was analyzed by Kirman and Phlips (1991), Hens, Kirman 
and Phlips (1992) and Baniak and Phlips (1995) and the results depend 
heavily on the kind of strategic interaction between duopolists (strategic 
substitutability or complementarity) and on the kind of economies of 
scale assumed.
A p p en d ix
A. P o sitiv e  M arginal R even u es per W orker
From (14) we know that (assuming e =  1)
MRW, =  f l U t f + ft) -  S'(f, +
92{<ii +  f t )  2 g2{q\ +  92)
(A.l)
15In such a situation the LMF faces an increase in revenues in the foreign market 
(as a result of the devaluation) and an increase in revenues in the domestic market 
(because the foreign PMF contracted its exports). It is not clear what the reaction 




























































































From the concavity of the revenue function R 2 we know that marginal 
revenue is lower than average revenue or
R l  < R2/q2. (A.2)
If the LMM operates on one, namely the foreign, market, then q\ =  0. 
From the assumption of diminishing returns from labour we conclude 
that average labour input is lower than marginal labour input, in other 
words
5 (92) / ^  < g'{q2)- (A.3)
From (A.2) and (A.3) we obtain that the numerator of the expression on 
the right hand side of (A.l) is negative, thus the marginal revenues per 
worker are always negative.
If the LMM operates on two markets then q\ > 0 and the average 
labour input g{q\ + q2)/q2 is high for small values of q2, in particular 
lim,,2_o +  92V 92 — + 00. Hence, we can conclude that for small 
values of q2 the marginal revenues per worker axe positive.
B . L inear E xam ple
If R % — qi(al — qi) and g(q) — q then the first-order conditions (5) and 
(6) are
ai -  2<7i
«2 — 2q2
9i(a i -  9i) +  92(02 -  92) ~  R (B.l)
9i +  92
9i(a i — 9i) +  92(02 — 92) — R (B.2)
9i +  92
After some manipulation we obtain from (B.l) and (B.2) Eqs. (19) and
(20).
By solving directly the system of equations (19) and (20) we get
q\ =  ^ [rn +  V2K -  m2) ,






























































































where m = (a\ — a2) /2. Both outputs qi and q2 will be nonnegative iff 
—y/K  < m < \fK .
From (B.3) and (B.4) we have
a i — qi =  «2  -  92 — ( « 1  +  ffl2 -  V 2 K  -  m 2 )  , (B-5)
and from (B.5) we get Eq. (21).
From (10), (11), (B.3) and (B.4) we get
d Q
de a2 — 2q2
2q2(a2 -  q2) 
9i +  92
(B.6)
After some computations, we obtain Eq. (22).
From Eqs. (21) and (11) we know that for a-i which lies above the
line
9i(ai -  9i) -  K  = 0, (B.7)
the LMM will increase its foreign sales after a devaluation. Equation 
(B.7) defines at as a function of 51:
di = ---- 1- 91 (B.8)
91
The function (B.8) decreases from +00 to 2\/~K (as q\ changes from 0 to 
\/K )  and is convex. Equation (B.3) defines 51 as an increasing function 
of m which has values 0, ~\/~K  and \[K  for m equal to — V~K, 0 and \[K  
respectively. Thus, the composition of functions (B.3) and (B.8) gives 
us a! as a function of m which is convex and increasing and has values 
+ 00, and 2y/K  for m equal to —\ / K ,0 and \[K  respectively.
This is the curve CD in Figure 4.
C. W elfare E ffects o f  E xp ort S u bsidy
We now derive formula (44). To evaluate d ll/d s we find from (1)
































































































g—  + (Y  -  w)— .
ds ds
(C.2)
An envelope condition tells us that dF/d.s =  q2/g  and thus dg/ds =  
g'dQ/ds. So, we can simplify (C.2) to
dn
ds
u 9' d(5  ?2 +  n ———.
9 ds
(C.3)
Substituting (C.3) into (43) yields (44).
Now we can compute the formula (46) from the linear example. 
From (38) we obtain
^  =  (C.4)
ds 2 Q K 1








The optimal level of profits II is
(C.5)
n =  qi(ai -  qi) +  q2(a2 -  q2) -  wQ -  K, (C.6)
which, by (B.5), is equal to
n  =  i  (fll +  a2 -  2w -  sJlK  -  m2) Q -  K. (C.7)
From (B.3), (B.4) we get
qlq2 — - ( K  — m2) and Q =  V2K  — m2. (C.8)
Substituting (C.7) cmd (C.8) into (C.5) and rearranging terms yields (46).
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